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Markets aggregate widely dispersed information and direct resources to where 
they produce the greatest value (Friedrich A. Hayek 1945; Adam Smith 1776). These 
dual roles of informational and allocative efficiency help explain why asset markets 
are often used to guide economic activity such as production and investment.
Many economic contexts involving production and investment are characterized 
by multiple equilibria (John Bryant 1983; Jack Hirshleifer 1983; Russell W. Cooper 
1999; Colin Camerer and Marc Knez 1997; Jordi Brandts and David J. Cooper 
2006). When asset markets are linked to such contexts, it is important to understand 
what role they play in aiding coordination and selecting equilibria. If asset markets 
obtain both informational and allocative efficiency in a multiple-equilibrium con-
text, then they should coordinate the beliefs of economic agents and guide behavior 
to an efficient equilibrium. Indeed, some evidence suggests that one-sided auction 
markets may facilitate efficient coordination in an environment with multiple equi-
libria (John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio, and Richard O. Beil 1993; Vincent 
Crawford and Bruno Broseta 1998). However, the broader question of whether asset 
markets generally lead to efficient coordination in environments with multiple equi-
libria remains an open question.
In this paper, we explore experimentally the influence of two-sided futures asset 
markets on behavior and outcomes in an economic activity characterized by multi-
plicity of equilibria. We use laboratory experiments, where we can control impor-
tant features of both the market and the underlying activity, and focus on situations 
where the outcome of the economic activity is sensitive to the behavior of small 
numbers of agents. The economic activity in our setting consists of a coordination 
game with Pareto-ranked equilibria, in which the payoff to each player is a function 
of her own choice, or input, and group output, which is some order statistic (such as 
the minimum) of all players’ input choices (see Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990; 
Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1991; Crawford 1995). Players all do better if they 
coordinate on the highest-output (efficient) equilibrium, which is Pareto-optimal, 
but they also prefer to select a lower input if they believe others will do so.
Coordination games of this kind have been applied widely to model economic 
activity, from the relationship between beliefs and output in macroeconomic  models 
(Cooper 1999), to public good provision (Hirshleifer 1983), to firm production 
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(Camerer and Knez 1997; Brandts and Cooper 2006).1 Financial markets are often 
linked to these kinds of economic activity. Therefore, we study the relationship 
between economic performance, measured by outcomes in the coordination game, 
and a corresponding asset market in which the traded assets’ values are contingent 
on the game outcome. In each period participants play the coordination game and 
receive payoffs from the outcome in the game. Prior to playing the game, participants 
trade in a market with Arrow-Debreu securities, each corresponding to one of the 
possible outcomes (output levels) in the game.2 Our primary purpose is to explore 
the extent to which markets influence outcomes in the underlying economic activ-
ity—that is, do markets guide behavior towards more or less efficient equilibria?
Previous experiments using similar games demonstrate that preplay communica-
tion can help reassure players of their mutual intent to pursue the efficient equilib-
rium and is thus effective for obtaining coordination on higher (more efficient) output 
(Andreas Blume and Andreas Ortmann 2007; Cooper, et al. 1992; Giovanna Devetag 
and Ortmann 2007). This includes communication that takes place through preplay 
market institutions; Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1993) show how auctioning off the 
right to play a subsequent coordination game serves as a way for players to commu-
nicate their beliefs about what will happen in the game and, implicitly, their intended 
strategies (see Crawford and Broseta 1998). The result is that the one-sided auction 
markets used by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1993) lead to coordination on the 
efficient high-output equilibrium of the game.
However, the kind of implicit communication allowed by two-sided asset markets 
and the incentives created by such markets makes efficient coordination in their pres-
ence questionable. For starters, two-sided asset markets are much more complex and 
potentially noisy than the more simple kinds of explicit and implicit communication 
used in previous experiments. There exist separate markets for each equilibrium 
output level, and players’ communication through the asset market may be difficult 
to interpret. For example, a player indicating a desire to buy assets corresponding 
to an inefficient equilibrium, even at a very low price, may create some doubt that 
the efficient equilibrium will result. Therefore, in contrast with previous results in 
which communication facilitates efficient coordination, preplay asset markets may 
also result in an opposite kind of market communication effect, one that leads play-
ers’ beliefs to converge on the inefficient equilibrium, even if the underlying payoffs 
from the coordination game have not changed.
But the market may also exert an influence on outcomes in the game by affect-
ing payoffs and incentives. In coordination games with high degrees of interde-
pendence, as when output is determined by the lowest input choice by any single 
player, the incentives produced by preplay asset markets may result in coordination 
on lower-output (less efficient) equilibria. Through what we term portfolio incentive 
1 For example, Hirshleifer (1983) and Glenn W. Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) discuss how production with 
high input-complementarity is present in collective responses to crises, where any input’s failure can be disastrous. 
Brandts and Cooper (2006) note that this kind of game can exist on an assembly line, where the slowest worker 
determines the overall speed of production.
2 Some markets trade explicit Arrow-Debreu securities, such as prediction markets designed to forecast future 
outcomes (Robert Forsythe et al. 1992) and Chicago Board of Trade binary options for macroeconomic variables 
(see http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/data/Fedfunds/index.cfm). Even more markets provide implicit Arrow-
Debreu structured securities through the use of derivatives such as S&P 500 index options (Yacine Aït-Sahalia and 
Andrew W. Lo 1998).
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effects, the asset market can create payoff-based incentives for players to invest in 
low output assets and then unilaterally decrease the group’s output in the coordina-
tion game. A market may thus create an incentive to engage in opportunism, thereby 
harming output in the underlying economic activity.
Our first experiment explores these portfolio incentive effects by using a “weak-
link” coordination game in which group output is determined by the lowest input 
by any player. In such a game, markets may lead to lower input choices, and the 
resulting inefficient equilibrium. Indeed, we find that the presence of a preplay asset 
market significantly reduces output. However, we also find that the distorted incen-
tives produced by the market’s presence cannot entirely explain the negative effect 
of the market on the game; the market lowers players’ input choices even when there 
is no distortion of incentives. This suggests that, aside from any effect the market 
may have on payoffs, it may also negatively affect output by communicating nega-
tive beliefs.
In a second experiment we explore the extent to which asset markets influence 
outcomes in a coordination game with weaker interdependence among players. We 
use the case where output is determined by the second-lowest input choice in a 
group, so that the market creates no incentive for any player to unilaterally lower her 
input choice. In this game, all of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria to the coordina-
tion game are preserved in the presence of a preplay asset market, regardless of what 
happens during market trading, so portfolio incentive effects are minimized. But the 
market may nevertheless yield lower input choices if it amplifies pessimistic beliefs. 
Our second experiment confirms this market communication effect; we again find 
that the presence of an asset market universally lowers input choices and the result-
ing output levels.
Thus, across both our experiments we find a negative effect of asset markets on 
output (efficiency) that cannot be explained entirely by the distorted payoffs of a 
portfolio incentive effect. Indeed, we even find that asset markets decrease output for 
groups whose game payoffs are completely independent of the market (Outsiders, 
who trade in an asset market linked to another group’s output). The overall pattern 
of effects we find is also consistent with a market communication effect, whereby 
prices and trading behavior appear to influence beliefs in a way that makes low-
output equilibria more frequent. Therefore, in spite of the prior evidence suggest-
ing that preplay communication mechanisms, including markets, facilitate efficient 
coordination, we find that such preplay institutions may also have detrimental effects 
and that such effects are not driven exclusively by distorted incentives.
In the next section, we present a model of a two-stage game involving a preplay 
asset market and a linked coordination game, which also serves as the basic frame-
work for our experiments. We leave the formal analysis of the game for the online 
Appendix but refer to the main results in the text. Sections II and III present our two 
experiments.
I.  Model
Players participate in a two-stage game consisting of an asset market followed by 
an order-statistic coordination game. The values of the securities traded in the asset 
market depend upon the realization of the output in the coordination game.
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In the second stage coordination game, each player simultaneously selects an input 
level  e​i ∈​{1, … , M }. Each player’s payoff depends upon her own input level and the 
group’s output,  m​j (e), which is determined by the input choices of all players:
(1)​  πi (e) = a + bmj(e) − c |​mj(e) − ei |
where  m​j (e) is the j th order statistic of the n chosen input levels, meaning that if 
input levels are ordered from low to high, or  e​(1)​≤​​e​(2)​≤​… ​e​(n)​, then  m​j (e)​=​​e​(j)​.
Assuming b,c​>​0, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are completely character-
ized by any selection of identical inputs for all players. The Nash equilibrium with 
e​i ​=​M for all i is the high output or efficient equilibrium and Pareto dominates any 
lower output equilibrium where  e​i ​=​m with m​<​M for all i.
When j​=​1 the coordination game is a version of the well-known “weak-link” 
or “minimum effort” coordination game first analyzed theoretically by Bryant 
(1983) and Hirshleifer (1983). Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) conducted 
an early experimental study of the game and found two regularities replicated by 
subsequent studies (Knez and Camerer 1994; Weber et al. 2001; Weber 2006). 
First, groups often fail to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Second, 
group size exerts a strong influence on equilibrium selection. Small groups of two 
to three players converge to much higher output levels than larger groups of six or 
more.
Other order statistic games where j​>​1 have also been studied (Van Huyck, 
Battalio, and Beil 1991; Van Huyck, Battalio, and Frederick W. Rankin 2007). 
Generally, higher order statistics facilitate coordination on equilibria correspond-
ing to higher input choices. However, even when j​>​1 efficient coordination is not 
trivial. Groups often end up at equilibrium output levels well below M, the result 
of a strong path dependence whereby initial output outcomes determine subsequent 
input choices. See Colin F. Camerer (2003), Chapter 7, for a review of experiments 
on order-statistic coordination games.
Prior to the coordination game all players participate in an asset market. In the 
market, the value of a traded security is based upon the output,  m​j (e), in the sub-
sequent coordination game. More precisely, there are M state-contingent securities 
traded with the following payoffs:
(2)  X​m = {​β​ if  m​j (e) = m ,​ ​ 0 otherwise
where β​>​0.
At the conclusion of trading in the asset market, all players possess a particular 
portfolio  x​i ​=​( x​1i  ,  x​2i  ,​… ,​ x​Mi ) of securities where  x​mi is player i’s units of asset  X​m .
Since these assets pay off based upon the outcome of the game, the original game 
payoffs from (1) are modified to be:
(3)​ ​_​πi(e; xi) = a + bmj(e) − c |​mj(e) − ei | +​β  ∑​
m=1
 
M
  δ​m (e)xmi ,
where  δ​m ​=​1 if  m​j (e)​=​m and 0 otherwise. We call this game the market-modified 
coordination game.
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We assume that the aggregate endowment for each asset is the same, or  ∑​i=1​n  ​x​mi ​=​k 
for all m. Under this assumption, the market is a constant-sum game, and therefore the 
efficiency properties of higher matched inputs in the market-modified coordination 
game are the same as in the original coordination game. However, different ex post 
portfolios can affect individual players’ incentives to select particular input levels.
In the online Appendix, we present a theoretical analysis of how the incentives 
produced by the market may affect behavior in the modified coordination game. Our 
two main results (propositions 1 and 2) show that when output in the coordination 
game is determined by the lowest input choice (​j​=​1) the asset market distorts 
players’ incentives to the point where equilibria involving input choices greater than 
1 can be ruled out, but that for higher order statistics (1​<​j​<​n) the set of equi-
libria are unchanged. We discuss these predictions and the intuition behind them in 
more detail when discussing our experiments in the next two sections.
II.  Experiment 1—Minimum-Input Coordination (​j​=​1)
Our first experiment explores the special case where j​=​1 and the output of the 
coordination game is determined by the lowest input. Such a high degree of interde-
pendence means that players may have an incentive to unilaterally decrease output.
One reason this can occur is that a player’s portfolio holdings,  x​i , at the end of the 
trading period may modify her incentives in the game. An input level m for all play-
ers will remain a pure strategy equilibrium of the game only if for all players i and 
for all lower output levels ℓ​<​m,3
(4)  x​ℓi − ​x​mi ≤ ​[​b _​β​]​(m − ℓ).
When a player has enough of an asset that pays off under lower output (relative to 
higher output assets), she has a weakly dominant strategy to play the correspond-
ing lower input. Thus, the lowest input choice,  e​i ​=​1, by all players is the only 
Nash equilibrium that exists for every possible asset portfolio. For higher output 
outcomes, the relative payoff of the asset market (β) to the coordination game (b) 
determines the asset portfolios that support equilibria of the market-modified game. 
This result suggests that the market may lead to lower output in the game, and that 
the extent to which it does so will be greater when the payoff from the market assets 
(β) is large relative to the payoffs from the game (b).
In order to examine this potential direct portfolio incentive effect in our experi-
ment, we systematically varied the payoffs from the market relative to those from 
the game. In the Market H variant we set b/β​=​2 and in the Market L variant, we 
set b/β​=​40. Thus, the Market L treatment significantly lowered the relative payoff 
of the market. In order to see the potential strength of this treatment, consider the 
differences in asset holdings that would be necessary to induce an individual to be 
unwilling to play the input level  e​i ​=​4. In the Market H treatment, the individual 
would have to hold greater than 2, 4, or 6, more units of the  X​3 ,  X​2 , or  X​1 assets 
3 See Proposition 1 in the online Appendix for a proof.
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respectively (than units of the  X​4 asset). Whereas, in the Market L treatment, the 
required minimum differences are 40, 80, and 120. Therefore, the condition in (4) 
predicts a likely much stronger negative effect of the market in the Market H treat-
ment than in Market L.
The above prediction relies on ex post asset allocations and therefore ignores the 
strategic nature of trading behavior, whereby participants in the market know what 
strategy they are likely to play in the game, and the market serves to aggregate this 
information. Moreover, players most likely jointly determine their trading strategies 
and game actions in the two stages of the market and game. To analyze this aspect 
of behavior in the two-stage game, we adopt a rational expectations framework in 
which the market fully aggregates players’ beliefs and behavior in the game is con-
sistent with such beliefs. The only rational expectations equilibrium when j​=​1 
is the inefficient one in which all players select the lowest input choice ( e​i ​=​1).4 
Any player can unilaterally assure that the final output is 1 by selecting  e​i ​=​1. This 
means that the only prices that are consistent with an equilibrium in both stages of 
the game must price the low output asset  X​1 at β, meaning that low output will occur 
with probability 1. If the price of the low output asset is lower than β then any player 
can profit by buying units of the low output asset, and once that player has a suf-
ficient number of these low output assets the player has a weakly dominant strategy 
to select the low input level  e​i ​=​1.
Our experiment tests the above predictions about the effects of an asset market, 
relative to a Control treatment in which there is no market. In contrast with prior 
evidence of the beneficial effects of institutions that allow preplay communication, 
including markets, our theoretical analysis predicts that preplay asset markets will 
have a negative effect on output levels in the game. We vary several features of the 
game and the market to better understand the precise relationship between the two. 
As we mention above, we vary the incentives of the market relative to the game 
(Market L versus Market H). We also vary the group size in which the game is 
played. Finally, to explore whether the market affects behavior and outcomes in 
the game even when the two are strategically independent, we include an Outsiders 
treatment in which players trade in a market that is unrelated to their coordination 
game. This final treatment allows us to determine the extent to which the market 
can influence behavior and outcomes in the coordination game, absent any portfolio 
incentive effects.
A. Experimental design
Each experimental session consisted of eight periods, all identical in structure. In 
each period, every subject submitted a number, corresponding to her input choice 
in the coordination game. The input choice took one of four values:  e​i ​=​{1, 2, 3, 4}. 
The payoff function was the same as in (1) with output determined by the mini-
mum input choice (​j​=​1). The parameters used were a​=​$1.20, b​=​$0.20, and 
c​=​$0.20. Thus, the payoff for the efficient equilibrium in the coordination game 
4 See Proposition 2 in the Online Appendix for a formal statement and proof.
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was $2.00. These parameters give rise to the payoff table displayed in Table 1, which 
is identical to the one presented to all subjects.5
Each subject was assigned to a group, which did not change throughout the exper-
iment. Each session consisted of both Small three-person groups and Large six-
person groups. All subjects knew their group assignment and the size of their group 
and the other groups. Throughout the session, no communication between subjects 
was permitted and all instructions, choices, and information were transmitted via the 
computer terminal, utilizing the z-tree program (Urs Fischbacher 2007).6
In the Control treatment subjects simply played the coordination game for eight 
periods. In the Market conditions, prior to playing the game in a period, subjects 
first traded in an asset market in which securities’ liquidating values depended upon 
the output in the coordination game.7 Trading took place anonymously over an elec-
tronic double-auction market lasting approximately six minutes. During that time 
subjects were free to submit limit orders, which were posted to the limit-order book, 
or to accept limit orders submitted by others. In addition to being able to see the five 
highest (lowest) current limit orders to sell (buy) for any security, subjects could 
view the entire trading price history for every security.8
Prior to trading, groups were assigned to markets such that the number of traders 
per market was fixed at nine. We kept the number of market traders constant across 
the Small and Large group treatments in order to control for the possibility that 
market size might affect the performance of the market, and to allow a comparison 
between Insider and Outsider traders. This was achieved by conducting two parallel 
sets of markets, each populated by one Small group and one Large group. In one 
set of markets the value of the securities was determined by the output of a Small 
group, and in the second the value of the securities was determined by the output of 
a Large group.9
5 The parameterization of the minimum-input game differs from that in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) and 
most other coordination game experiments in that there are fewer input level choices available. This was necessary 
in order to keep the number of traded securities reasonable.
6 Screen shots of the instructions and market trading platform are provided in the online Appendix.
7 In two of the market treatment sessions, only six market periods were conducted due to time considerations. In 
both cases, subjects still participated in eight game periods with their initial endowment taken as their payoff from 
the market for the final two periods.
8 In order to ensure that subjects understood the market operation, they completed a short quiz and were given the 
opportunity to ask questions in a practice trading round that was not linked to any game outcome.
9 A typical session divided 18 subjects into four groups as follows: groups A and C were Small groups, and 
groups B and d were Large groups. Market 1 included members from groups A and B trading securities linked to 
the output of group A, and Market 2 included members from groups C and d trading securities linked to the output 
of group d.
Table 1—Minimum-Input Game Payoff Table (Exp 1)
Minimum input
(output)
4 3 2 1
Player’s
input
4 2.00 1.60 1.20 0.80
3 1.80 1.40 1.00
2 1.60 1.20
1 1.40
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At the beginning of each trading stage, subjects were endowed with units of the 
different assets and with an interest-free loan of cash. The endowments varied across 
subjects and across periods, but the aggregate endowment at the beginning of each 
trading period was equal across securities at 54 units.10 The aggregate endowment 
did not constrain further trading; subjects could sell each asset short.11
The Market H and Market L treatments varied the value of the asset market rela-
tive to the game in order to examine the influence of the portfolio incentive effect we 
describe above. In the Market H treatment, we set b/β​=​2 by setting the binary pay-
off of each asset at β​=​$0.10 whereas in the Market L treatment we set b/β​=​40 
by setting β​=​$0.005.12
Each market contained two types of traders. Insiders were subjects who traded 
on outcomes that they could directly influence, meaning that their own game deter-
mined asset values. Outsiders traded on an exogenous outcome, meaning that asset 
values were determined by the outcome of the other group’s game. Our theoretical 
analysis of portfolio incentive effects (see the Online Appendix) only applies to 
Insiders, whose input choices affect the liquidation value of their asset holdings. 
For Outsiders, the value of their asset holdings is completely independent of output 
in their own coordination game. Thus, the set of Nash equilibria for the Outsiders’ 
game is unaffected by the presence of an asset market and is the same as in the 
Control treatment. However, Outsiders might still be affected by potential market 
communication effects; they observe market prices and may believe that those prices 
also provide information about the intended play in their group.
At the end of the market trading stage, subjects participated in the coordination 
game. Then, subjects’ positions in the securities were liquidated according to the 
appropriate group’s output. Subjects observed the anonymous distribution of input 
choices in their own group as well as the input choices made by subjects in the other 
group (of the other size) participating in their market. The feedback from the game 
provided to subjects in all variants of the experiment was the same; in the Control 
treatment, subjects were also informed of the choices in their group as well as those 
in a group of the other size.
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratory for Economic Management and 
Auctions (LEMA) at The Pennsylvania State University, between October 2006 and 
October 2007. Panel A in Table 2 describes the data collected. In every condition, 
half (8, 12, and 8 respectively) of the groups were Large and the other half were 
Small. In the two Market conditions, half of the groups were Insiders and the other 
half were Outsiders. No subject appeared in more than one session. Participants 
received a show-up fee of $6 and an additional performance-based payment aver-
aging $13.18 (Control), $15.17 (Market H), and $11.40 (Market L). In the Market 
10 For every asset, two subjects in each period had an endowment of 24 units of that particular asset and none 
of the other three assets. One subject in each period had an endowment of six units of each of the four assets. The 
choice of asymmetric endowments (across subjects) is common in these types of asset markets and was designed to 
stimulate trading by providing participants with rebalancing motives.
11 A margin requirement was used to ensure that no subject’s short sales exceeded the amount of their cash loan, 
resulting in losses beyond that loan.
12 The parameter amounts for the game and market were expressed to subjects in “experimental dollars,” and the 
appropriate exchange rate was selected so that, in both treatments, the liquidation values of the assets were exactly 
1 experimental dollar. This allowed prices to potentially directly reveal probabilistic information in both Market 
treatments. The values in the coordination game were also varied accordingly so as to keep the same dollar payoff 
from the coordination game for all treatments.
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treatments, the payments from the markets contributed on average $4.85 (Market H) 
and $0.25 (Market L) to this total. Market sessions lasted around two hours.
B. Results
Insider group Output—We first explore the effects of our market treatments on 
output for Control versus Insider groups. As depicted in Figure 1, across all eight 
periods, mean output differed considerably by treatment. Small Control groups 
obtained coordination on mean output levels very close to the efficient level, while 
Large groups coordinated on output of around 2.4.13 As predicted, for Insider groups 
mean output was lower in both Market treatments, relative to the Control, and this 
effect was stronger when market incentives were high.
In Table 3, we examine the relationship between group output, Market treatments, 
and group size. We use ordered probit regressions, which take into account the ordi-
nal nature of output, and estimate a model that includes group random effects. The 
Market treatments produce output that is substantially lower compared with the 
Control treatment (columns 1, 2, and 3); this result also holds when controlling 
for group size.14 As expected, group output is lower for large groups. Finally, we 
observe that in the Market H treatment output is reduced further than in the Market 
L treatment, when controlling for group size (column 3).15
These findings suggest that, consistent with our predictions, the presence of an 
asset market in conjunction with a minimum-input coordination game significantly 
lowers output levels for all Insider group sizes and periods. These results stand in 
contrast to the findings of Blume and Ortmann (2007), Cooper et al. (1992), and 
Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1993), which show that other forms of preplay 
13 This is higher than is typically the case for large groups, which usually converge to the least efficient equi-
librium. However, our experiment differs from many previous experiments in important ways: it uses fewer input 
choices (e.g., 4 versus 7 in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990), has smaller group sizes (e.g., 3 and 6 versus 14 
and 16 in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990), provides subjects with the full history of choices by other players, 
and also shows players in each Large group the performance of a Small group (Gary Bornstein, Uri Gneezy, and 
Rosmarie Nagel 2002). While these factors may influence behavior in our experiment, relative to other experi-
ments using similar coordination games, they are constant across all our treatments. Also, consistent with previous 
research, output generally fell (though slightly) across periods in the Control-Large treatment—e.g., by period 8 
mean output was 1.9.
14 Throughout this section, unless noted otherwise, we analyze data obtained from Insider groups only.
15 We find that markets have similar negative and significant effects when we look at Period 1 results only and 
when we treat each group as a single observation consisting of that group’s median output level over the last five 
periods of the experiment.
Table 2—Summary of the Data Collected
Control Market H Market L
Panel A. Experiment 1
Sessions 4 6 7
Groups 16 24 16
Individuals 72 108 72
Panel B. Experiment 2
Sessions 3 − 4
Groups 12 − 16
Individuals 54 − 72
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 communication, including an auction market, produce coordination on higher out-
put levels. To better understand what drives these results we turn to study two asset 
market dimensions that can influence behavior: portfolio incentives and security 
prices.
Portfolio Incentives—For Insiders, players’ asset positions when j​=​1 may nega-
tively influence output through a distortion of individual incentives. Players who 
hold enough low-output assets may prefer to make low-input choices, regardless of 
their beliefs about others’ behavior. This suggests a positive relationship between 
the amount of an asset an individual Insider holds, and the likelihood that individual 
will select the corresponding input. Moreover, we expect these portfolio incentives 
to be stronger when market incentives are high than when they are low.
Table 4 shows the results obtained from probit regressions of individuals’ input 
choices on their end-of-period portfolio holdings of securities 1, 2, 3, and 4, when 
taking into account market level random effects. We find that subjects who choose 
Figure 1. Average Group Output across Periods (Exp 1)
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an input level m hold more m security units and fewer non-m security units. For 
example, column 1 in the table indicates that subjects are more likely to choose an 
input level of 1 with every additional unit of asset  X​1 held. In this case, increased 
holdings of assets  X​2 ,  X​3 , and  X​4 have a negative, although not statistically signifi-
cant, effect. Similar patterns emerge if we look at the other input levels; all diagonal 
elements are positive and statistically significant, while all off-diagonal elements in 
these columns are negative.16 Further, these results hold with similar magnitude for 
both the Market H and the Market L treatments.17
16 Subjects shorted assets in a substantial number of cases. Overall, 21 percent of the final portfolio holdings 
included a short sell of at least one of the four assets in the Market H condition and 27 percent in the Market L condi-
tion. However, we do not find that subjects’ input choices are abnormally influenced by short sells.
17 This relationship also generally rules out “hedging” by players who adopt different asset positions than their 
intended play in the coordination game in order to lower payoff variability.
Table 3—Group Output by Condition Relative to Control (Exp 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group output: Insiders (versus Control) Group output: Outsiders (versus Control)
Market −3.936*** −3.809*** −3.877*** −4.269*** −4.168*** −4.587***
[0.485] [0.655] [0.431] [0.661] [0.623] [0.681]
Market H −1.636 −2.614*** −0.36 0.213
[1.237] [0.425] [0.292] [0.371]
Large group −1.241*** −0.667***
[0.138] [0.140]
Period −0.02 −0.019 −0.023 −0.079 −0.079 −0.079
[0.059] [0.060] [0.063] [0.060] [0.059] [0.061]
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288
Log likelihood −176.79 −173.41 −161.85 −194.82 −193.96 −194.46
Notes: Ordered probit regression with group random effects; Huber-White standard errors. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 4—Individual Portfolio Holdings and Input Choices (Exp 1, Insiders)
Input = 1 Input =​2 Input = 3 Input = 4
Holdings (1) (2) (3) (4)
Security 1 0.043*** −0.015*** −0.031* −0.014**
[0.009] [0.005] [0.017] [0.006]
Security 2 −0.017 0.034*** −0.007 −0.014***
[0.012] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004]
Security 3 −0.012 −0.024*** 0.043*** −0.004
[0.010] [0.007] [0.015] [0.005]
Security 4 −0.012 −0.001 −0.018 0.025**
[0.011] [0.008] [0.011] [0.011]
Constant −0.282 −1.003*** −1.529*** −0.730***
[0.194] [0.177] [0.358] [0.115]
Observations 720 720 720 720
Fraction 0.453 0.186 0.142 0.219
Log likelihood −365.13 −275.11 −191.72 −280.92
Notes: Probit regression with market random effects; Huber-White standard errors. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Given that individuals’ choices are related to their portfolio holdings, we test the 
implications of the portfolio incentive effect more directly by computing the set of 
Nash equilibria that persist in the coordination game after trading in the market. For 
each group and period we find the set of pure-strategy equilibria that are incentive 
compatible with subjects’ ex post security holdings and the modified payoffs of the 
game. Table 5 presents the observed distributions of group output for different real-
ized sets of equilibria remaining in the game modified by ex post asset holdings. 
For example, column 2, labeled “{1, 2},” reports the frequency of different output 
levels observed when only matched input levels of 1 or 2 remain Nash equilibria of 
the market-modified coordination game following trading (i.e., satisfy the condi-
tion in (4)). Panel A reports the results for Small groups, while panel B reports the 
results for Large groups. For comparison, we include the corresponding distribution 
of output choices observed in the Control treatment in the last column, where game 
payoffs are not modified by the market so the set of equilibria is always {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Final portfolio holdings’ influence on the set of pure-strategy equilibria is also 
reflected in behavior; observed behavior rarely falls outside the set of equilibria that 
are consistent with subjects’ holdings (see the first three columns). Thus, portfolio 
incentive effects can account for some of the decline in output in the presence of asset 
markets. But, even when holding the set of equilibria constant, we find that for both 
Small and Large groups, output levels are substantially lower in the Market treat-
ments than in the Control treatment. This is apparent when contrasting the distribu-
tion of group output when portfolio incentives do not eliminate any of the equilibria 
(column labeled “{1, 2, 3, 4}”) with the distribution of group output in the Control 
treatment. For example, 70 percent of the Large groups in the Market treatments, 
for which portfolio holdings did not eliminate any of the equilibria, selected output 
of 1 compared with 33 percent in the Control treatment. If we use ordered probit 
random-effects regressions (such as the one used in Table 3), using only cases for 
the Market treatments in which all four pure-strategy equilibria remain as equilib-
ria to the market-modified game (i.e., the observations in column “{1, 2, 3, 4}”), we 
again find a negative and statistically significant effect for the market treatments. 
Thus, while portfolio incentive effects appear to be at least partly responsible for the 
Table 5—Portfolio Holdings and Equilibrium Selection (Exp 1)
{1} {1, 2} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 3, 4} Overall Control
Panel A. small groups
Output = 4 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.13 0.72
Output = 3 0.09 0.11 0.33 0.26 0.16 0.23
Output = 2 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.14 0.03
Output = 1 0.82 0.78 0.67 0.19 0.58 0.02
Observations 34 9 3 31 80 64
Panel B. Large groups
Output = 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23
Output = 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30
Output = 2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.10 0.14
Output = 1 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.70 0.90 0.33
Observations 46 2 0 23 80 64
939kOgAN ET AL.: COORdINATION IN THE PREsENCE Of AssET MARkETsVOL. 101 NO. 2
decrease in output in the presence of markets, they cannot alone account for the full 
set of findings. The presence of asset markets leads to significantly lower output, even 
when the set of equilibria in the market-modified coordination game are unaffected.18
Outsiders’ Behavior—Recall that the Market treatments contained both Insiders 
and Outsiders. The two groups differ in that Outsiders’ incentives in the coordina-
tion game are unaffected by the presence of markets. If portfolio incentive effects 
are the only channel through which markets affect behavior, Outsiders’ output levels 
should resemble those in the Control treatment. However, Outsiders’ beliefs may be 
affected by prices and trading in the market that is unrelated to their game, allowing 
a possible market communication effect to influence their game’s output similarly to 
the effect the market has on Insider groups.
Returning to Figure 1, we see that Outsider groups’ output is considerably lower 
than in the Control. In fact, they obtain output levels very close to those observed 
for Insider groups. Columns 4 through 6 in Table 3 compare output for Control and 
Outsider groups, using ordered probit regressions with random effects. The results 
confirm that Outsiders’ output is significantly lower than that of Control groups.19
These results are anomalous if one holds the view that the presence of markets 
affects behavior entirely through portfolio incentive effects. Outsiders’ incentives 
in the coordination game are unchanged by the presence of the asset market, so any 
explanation for lower output among Insiders that is based only on modified incen-
tives cannot explain why Outsider groups’ output changes in a very similar manner.
Price Informativeness—Since portfolio incentive effects alone do not fully 
account for the detrimental effect of markets on output, we turn to study the role 
of market prices. Market trading behavior, including prices, could serve as a form 
of communication, coordinating players’ beliefs regarding expected output. Such 
a market communication effect, which could influence both Insider and Outsider 
groups, would rely on prices to provide information about the subsequent output 
level. Our theoretical analysis assumes that market prices fully reveal future output. 
We find that prices affect individual input choices. Indeed, the correlation between 
the fraction of subjects who choose a given input level m and the average closing 
price of security m, for all securities, is 0.45 and is statistically different from zero 
at the 1 percent level.
We also examine the informativeness of market prices about the subsequent group 
output. We create a measure of price-based expected output by multiplying the stan-
dardized prices by the corresponding output associated with that asset.20 Table 6 
shows, using ordered probit regressions of group output on price-based expected 
18 Recall that the only fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium when j​=​1 involves output equaling 1 
and the market forecasting this outcome (see Proposition 2 in the online Appendix). If we take the market forecast 
as the output level with the highest market price in the trading period, we find support for this equilibrium predic-
tion. In 58 percent of all periods for Insider groups, the highest price corresponds to an output of 1, and the subse-
quent output equals 1. This proportion is slightly higher for Market H (66 percent) than for Market L (47 percent). 
In the first period, 35 percent of groups conform to the prediction.
19 The difference between Insider and Outsider output is not statistically significant. In testing whether Outsiders 
hold different end-of-period portfolios compared with Insiders, we find no statistical difference.
20 For example, if the prices of assets 1 and 2 are 0.5 each, the price-based expected output would be equal to 1.5. 
We use the average price over the last five trades (in each period) as our measure of market price for that period. 
When less than five trades are completed, we average all the trades conducted in that market and period. As is 
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 output, and a number of treatment and control variables, a positive relationship 
between market-predicted output and the subsequent actual group output. We 
account for the possibility that this positive relationship is driven by prices merely 
adjusting to past outcomes, rather than influencing subsequent outcomes, by includ-
ing the groups’ prior period output in the regressions as a control. While there is 
a strong (positive) relation between a group’s output in period t​−​1 and period t, 
period t prices additionally predict group output.21 Thus, prices seem to play a criti-
cal role in how the market influences the coordination game, beyond simply reflect-
ing information in past outcomes.22
III.  Experiment 2: Weaker Complementarities in Production (​j​=​2)
Our first experiment demonstrates a negative effect of asset markets on efficiency 
in a linked minimum-input coordination game. Our predictions, based on the prop-
erty that in such games any player can unilaterally lower output, posit that the mar-
ket’s effects should be based largely on the modified incentives produced either by 
realized or potential portfolio positions. However, the market’s effect in our first 
experiment appears to go further—reducing output even when market incentives 
are low and when incentives in the game are entirely unchanged, as they are for 
Outsiders. This finding suggests that, in addition to any portfolio incentive effects 
produced by markets, there is a market communication effect whereby the market 
also influences output by negatively affecting players’ beliefs.
common in the literature, see Joyce E. Berg and Thomas A. Rietz (2003), we standardize prices such that they add 
up to one in each market. As a result, we drop observations that do not contain price information for all securities.
21 Consistent with the idea that subjects use prices to coordinate their behavior, we find that nonequilibrium 
behavior in the form of input levels that exceed the minimum in the group are lower in the Market treatment com-
pared with the Control treatment. Thus, markets help reduce “wasted input.”
22 The results are qualitatively similar, though statistically weaker, for Outsider groups.
Table 6—Security Prices and Group Output (Exp 1, Insiders)
Group output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expected output 1.411*** 1.418*** 1.392*** 1.311***
[0.299] [0.232] [0.264] [0.318]
Market H −1.068* −1.237**
[0.584] [0.596]
Large group −0.451 −0.786**
[0.502] [0.382]
Last period 1.329*** 1.254*** 1.261*** 1.139***
 output [0.286] [0.240] [0.294] [0.221]
Period 0.233*** 0.212** 0.212** 0.145
[0.086] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Observations 88 88 88 88
Log likelihood −36.40 −36.40 −39.31 −35.05
Notes: Ordered probit regressions; standard errors are clustered by group. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Our second experiment more directly tests for such a market communication 
effect by exploring an environment in which the incentive effects produced by the 
market are very weak. We use a “second-order statistic” coordination game (​j​=​2), 
in which output is determined by the second-lowest input choice. The portfolio 
incentive effect when j​=​2 should be nonexistent. For any combination of port-
folio holdings, all of the matched input outcomes remain equilibria since no single 
player can unilaterally determine the output level (see Proposition 1 in the online 
Appendix). For similar reasons, all equilibria from the game with no market are 
preserved as fully revealing rational expectations equilibria with the preplay asset 
market when j​=​2 (see Proposition 2). Therefore, any change in output in this case 
is unlikely to result from portfolio incentives and is more likely the product of a 
market communication effect.
A. Experimental design
Sessions for this experiment were identical to those for Experiment 1, except that 
group output in the coordination game in each period was determined by the second 
lowest input in the group (j​=​2, see Table 7). We used the market payoffs from the 
Market L treatment from Experiment 1 and changed the instructions only to reflect 
that the second-lowest choice would determine payoffs in the coordination game. 
See panel B in Table 2 for summary of the data collected.
B. Results
The presence of asset markets again induces lower output in all treatments—i.e., 
for both Large and Small groups and for Insider and Outsider groups—though the 
effects are not as strong as in Experiment 1 (Figure 2). Table 8 reports ordered pro-
bit regressions with group random effects, similar to those for Experiment 1. The 
results show that output in the Market treatment is significantly lower than in the 
Control treatment in all specifications, and for both Insider and Outsider groups.23
We also look at the relationship between prices and outcomes, where a market 
communication effect would predict a positive relationship between the output level 
predicted by the market and actual output. As in Experiment 1, we again construct 
a measure of price-based expected output. Table 9 shows that price-based expected 
output is strongly related to group output, controlling for group size, period number, 
and previous period output. Notably, the coefficient on expected output is larger than 
for previous period output. As in Experiment 1, the market forecasts future output, 
indicating a strong role for market prices in coordinating players’ beliefs.24
23 The adverse market effect on output is roughly half as large in Experiment 2 as in Experiment 1 (controlling 
for group size and period). This difference is significant at the 1 percent level. In results not reported here we find 
that Insiders’ output is not statistically different from Outsiders’ output. Also, in testing whether Outsiders hold 
different end-of-period portfolios compared with Insiders, we find no statistical difference.
24 We can also explore the relationship between output in “paired” groups that could observe one another. To do 
so, we calculate the average output for each group across all eight periods and then compare the output in linked 
groups. Pooling across the Control (no market) groups in both experiments, there is very little relationship between 
average output for small groups and the linked large groups (the correlation is −0.06 and is statistically insignifi-
cant). This is perhaps not surprising, since there was relatively little variance for small group output in the control 
treatments. However, pooling across both experiments, the correlation in output between linked Insider/Outsider 
market groups is much higher (the correlation is 0.56 and is statistically significant at p​=​0.002). This pattern is 
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IV.  Conclusion
We explore the relationship between asset markets and underlying economic 
activity modeled by a coordination game. We find that the presence of an asset mar-
ket influences aggregate behavior, measured by output in the coordination game, in 
a significantly negative manner.
consistent with a market communication effect, whereby Outsider market groups are influenced by expectations in 
their linked Insider group.
Table 7—Second-Order-Statistic-Input Game Payoff Table (Exp 2)
Second lowest input
(output)
4 3 2 1
Player’s
input
4 2.00 1.60 1.20 0.80
3 1.80 1.80 1.40 1.00
2 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.20
1 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40
Figure 2. Average Group Output across Periods (Exp 2)
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In the first experiment, we find that preplay asset markets significantly decrease 
output in an economic environment where the high level of input interdependence 
creates portfolio-based incentives likely to lead to lower input choices. But in the 
second experiment no player could unilaterally decrease output, and therefore the 
portfolio incentive effects that potentially exerted great influence in the first experi-
ment were significantly weaker. We nevertheless find that the market significantly 
diminishes output in the subsequent coordination game. Thus, across all treatments 
in both experiments, the presence of an asset market decreases output, regardless of 
group size, the degree of interdependence in the game, and the relative incentives 
in the market and game. Perhaps most surprisingly, this is true even for Outsiders, 
whose game is strategically independent of the asset market.
These results suggest that, in addition to any incentive distortion effects produced 
by the market, a great deal of influence is exerted by a market communication effect, 
Table 8—Group Output by Condition Relative to Control (Exp 2)
Group output: Insiders (versus Control) Group output: Outsiders (versus Control)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market −2.739*** −0.862** −3.063*** −3.306***
[0.651] [0.352] [0.629] [0.840]
Large group −0.406*** −1.136***
[0.135] [0.272]
Period 0.129** 0.142** 0.177** 0.178**
[0.063] [0.063] [0.071] [0.071]
Observations 160 160 160 160
Log likelihood −88.58 −87.51 −78.55 −75.12
Notes:​Ordered probit regression with group random effects; Huber-White standard errors. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9—Security Prices and Group Output (Exp 2, Insiders)
Group output
(1) (2)
Expected output 1.521** 1.883**
[0.760] [0.865]
Large group −0.238*
[0.128]
Last period output 0.657* 0.511
[0.338] [0.379]
Period −0.170* −0.186*
[0.093] [0.096]
Observations 54 54
Log likelihood −45.37 −43.54
Notes: Ordered probit regressions; standard errors are clustered by group. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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whereby prices and trading behavior influence players’ beliefs about what will hap-
pen in the subsequent coordination game. This is consistent with the fact that in 
both experiments prices forecast output, and this predictive power goes beyond sim-
ply extrapolating from past output levels. Thus, market trading appears informative 
about likely future output levels, and this kind of implicit communication is self-
reinforcing due to the incentive to match others’ behavior in the coordination game. 
In prior research, such communication has generally facilitated coordination on the 
efficient equilibrium, but here we find strong negative effects.
In the online Appendix, we demonstrate how the presence of a market may exacer-
bate players’ uncertainty and lead to lower output, by examining a particular model 
of persistent (but small) strategic uncertainty (Proposition 3). We show that if any 
player has a small amount of “doubt” regarding the actions of the other players then 
even for order statistics higher than the minimum, such as the second order statistic 
(​j​=​2), any rational expectations equilibrium entailing higher input is unstable. 
However, this theoretical analysis makes no prediction regarding the direction of 
influence of a market when n​=​3 and j​=​2, where we still find a negative effect of 
the market on output. Therefore, this theoretical account of our experimental find-
ings is only partial—it explains why the introduction of an asset market may lead to 
lower output in most of our experimental conditions, but not in all of them. Further 
work should attempt to more precisely identify why the asset markets have a nega-
tive influence. Also, given the beneficial effects of communication in prior research, 
and the fact that some subjects in our experiments attempted to use the market to 
signal an intention to select high input,25 another open research question involves 
the point at which market communication yields positive effects. Therefore, when 
generalizing our results it is important to be cautious about the likely possibility that 
other contexts—for example, those in which input complementarity is weaker—
may yield a substantively different market influence.
It is also worth comparing our results to those of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 
(1993), who find that a preplay market leads to coordination on higher (more effi-
cient) equilibria. In our experiment, the preplay asset markets lead to less efficient 
output levels. This is even true in the particular case in our second experiment where 
group size is Small (n​=​3) and the relevant order statistic (​j​=​2) is therefore the 
median, as in Van Huyck et al.’s experiment.26 In this special case we again find that 
the asset market produces a negative effect on output, providing a compelling com-
parison of how two different market institutions can lead to very different outcomes 
when paired with similar games.
We believe the key difference between our experiment and Van Huyck et al.’s 
to be the symmetry in our asset market that is not present in their study. In their 
experiment, the market creates jointly held positive expectations of group outcomes 
25 While our focus here is on aggregate behavior and outcomes and not on individual behavior, we also examined 
different bidding strategies used by individual subjects. We created a measure of “optimism signaling,” indicating 
whether in a given period a subject submitted an order to buy asset 4 for a price greater than 0.50. We found such 
behavior in both Large and Small groups, with some subjects persistently offering to buy asset 4 across rounds. But 
we also found that in both Large and Small groups the number of subjects trying to signal optimism decreased in 
the second half of the session.
26 Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1993) do not examine such small group sizes, using a group size of nine, but 
as we note previously smaller groups should generally result in more efficient coordination. Our payoff function is 
also different than that used by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1993).
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by eliminating those players who do not hold such optimistic beliefs. Therefore, 
the end result is mutual reassurance among those selected by the market to play 
the game (Crawford and Broseta 1998). In our setting however, the market allows 
both positive and negative signals to players, and in addition does not exclude 
players with beliefs that correspond to the inefficient outcome. Thus, our markets 
convey strategic uncertainty to players, rather than reducing it as in Van Huyck et 
al.’s experiment, and allow it to “snowball” into negative expectations about the 
likely final outcome. The difference between the two experiments can be viewed as 
contrasting existence results about how markets impact economic outcomes. Real 
economic contexts in which markets and economic activity are coupled will often 
resemble one experiment more than the other. We show that considering the precise 
influence of markets on economic behavior is of significant importance to someone 
attempting to design a market institution to aid in efficient equilibrium selection.
More generally, our results also stand in contrast to the stylized fact that greater 
communication facilitates efficient coordination in games like these (Blume and 
Ortmann 2007; Cooper et al. 1992). We demonstrate that allowing players to inter-
act via asset markets linked to multiple equilibria, which allows rich and costly 
communication of intentions and beliefs, has a negative influence on which equilib-
rium obtains. In this regard, our work is similar to theoretical work demonstrating 
the potentially harmful effects of public information, including endogenously gen-
erated public signals (Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin 2002; George-Marios 
Angeletos and Ivan Werning 2006; Frank Heinemann, Nagel, and Peter Ockenfels 
2004) in coordination games with incomplete information (global games). However, 
while this prior work demonstrates that such public information can induce multiple 
equilibria, where incomplete information would otherwise yield uniqueness, our 
results demonstrate how such a signal, when generated by a two-sided asset market, 
can make the inefficient low-output equilibrium more likely. Future research might 
therefore examine the correspondence between these two sets of results.
Outside the laboratory, markets often have enticing information aggregation and 
forecasting possibilities when linked to some kinds of economic activity. Yet our work 
suggests that in some settings the markets themselves might influence the eventual real-
ization of the economic outcome and, worse yet, may do so negatively. For example, 
many firms have implemented prediction markets to forecast outcomes such as sales 
and product quality (Bo Cowgill, Justin Wolfers, and Eric Zitzewitz 2008; Wolfers 
and Zitzewitz 2004). Given that in such settings market traders may have the ability 
to influence outcomes, our results suggest that the presence of production-linked asset 
markets may negatively influence outcomes both by creating incentive problems and 
by pessimistically influencing beliefs. Additionally, many macroeconomic models rely 
upon some relationship between expectations and productivity, as in our underlying 
game (Bryant 1983; Cooper and Andrew John 1988). Given markets’ role in com-
municating and influencing expectations in our experiment, real-world markets may 
sometimes similarly play an important role in contributing to shifts into inefficient 
equilibria. Thus, for example, economic crises may be exacerbated by economic agents 
focusing their attention on market behavior, which may create self-reinforcing pessi-
mistic beliefs. Broadly, our work suggests that whenever economic activity involving 
high degrees of complementarity is linked to asset markets, policymakers may want to 
explore the possibility of perverse effects of the kind we have found here.
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